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Gender Gaps in Families, Health Care, and Industry †

Compensating Differentials for Sexual Harassment
By Joni Hersch*
Sexual harassment is prohibited under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as discrimination on the basis of sex. Although sexual
harassment is illegal, some workers are sexually harassed on the job. For example, a 1994
survey of federal employees by the US Merit
Systems Protection Board found that 44 percent
of women and 19 percent of men had experienced unwanted sexual attention on the job in
the preceding two years. Sexual harassment
claims comprise a large component of charges
filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC).
Sexual harassment is widely viewed as an
instrument of power and intimidation rather
than primarily as an expression of sexual desire,
and such harassing behavior may cause victims
as well as their coworkers to be less productive.
Indeed, sexual harassment is a form of employment discrimination precisely because it alters
the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” and interferes unreasonably with the ability of those in the protected classes to perform
their jobs. Sexual harassment may lead to lower
pay if harassment reduces worker productivity
by, for instance, inducing inefficient turnover,
increasing absenteeism, and generally wasting
work time as workers attempt to avoid interaction with harassers.
An alternative hypothesis is that, similar to
jobs in which workers face a high risk of death
or disabling injury, workplace sexual harassment is an undesirable working condition that

may generate a compensating pay differential.
There are, of course, clear differences between
job risks and sexual harassment. Job risks are
usually a consequence of the technology in the
industry, whereas sexual harassment arises from
illegal personal behavior. Yet similar to job risks,
sexual harassment is costly for firms to eliminate,
which may result in sexually harassing behavior
occurring in some workplace environments.
Thus, the direction of the relation between
sexual harassment and wages is not predictable
a priori. While pay differentials on the basis of
sex and on job risks and other working conditions have been widely studied by economists,
sexual harassment has received little attention
within the economics literature.1
This paper provides evidence of the relation between the risk of sexual harassment and
wages. While one approach to detecting the
effect on wages of sexual harassment would
be to estimate wage equations controlling for
whether an individual reports that he or she had
been sexually harassed, sexual harassment on
the job is unlikely to be exogenous with respect
to wages, and it is difficult to identify appropriate variables that would allow instrumental variables estimation. In addition, there are almost
no data reporting information on sexual harassment as well as wages and other determinants
of wages.
To avoid these problems, I adopt the conventional hedonic wage methodology used to estimate compensating wage differentials for risk
of injury or death. Specifically, using data on
individual charges filed with the EEOC (which
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1
Examples of papers in the economics literature analyzing sexual harassment include Heather Antecol and Deborah
Cobb-Clark (2006), examining the effect of sexual harassment on job satisfaction and quit intentions; Kaushik Basu
(2003), providing a theoretical analysis of how laws prohibiting sexual harassment can improve welfare for all workers;
and David N. Laband and Bernard F. Lentz (1998), examining the effect of sexual harassment on lawyers’ pay, job
satisfaction, and quit intentions.
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I obtained under the Freedom of Information
Act), I calculate gender-specific estimates of the
risk of sexual harassment by industry and age
group.
Matching these risk measures to data from
the Current Population Survey (CPS), I estimate
wage equations controlling for the risk of sexual
harassment and for other determinants of wages,
including occupation and the percent female in
the worker’s industry. The wage equation estimates show that greater risk of sexual harassment is associated with a statistically significant
wage premium. Women employed in jobs with
an average probability of sexual harassment are
paid a compensating differential of 25 cents per
hour relative to comparable women employed
in jobs with no risk of sexual harassment. Men
employed in jobs with an average probability of
sexual harassment are paid a compensating differential of 50 cents per hour relative to comparable men employed in jobs with no risk of
sexual harassment.
I. Prevalence and Rates of Sexual Harassment

There are two categories of sexual harassment
that are prohibited under Title VII. Sexual harassment involving a tangible employment benefit (“quid pro quo”) occurs when a supervisor
requires sexual favors as a basis for employment
decisions such as promotion or compensation.
Hostile work environment sexual harassment
does not involve a tangible employment benefit
and includes behaviors such as coworkers who
tell obscene jokes, make sexual suggestions or
requests for sex, or routinely make demeaning
comments about women’s ability to perform
jobs because of their sex. The majority of sexual
harassment litigation involves hostile work environment discrimination.
The measure of sexual harassment risk used
in this paper is calculated using charges of
sexual harassment filed with the EEOC or the
corresponding state or local Fair Employment
Practices Agency (FEPA). About 90,000 individuals file claims of employment discrimination annually. About 14,000 of these claims
include allegations of sexual harassment. There
are about 150 million individuals in the labor
force, so clearly few workers file legal charges
of discrimination generally or of sexual harassment. But this does not mean that sexual harassment is rare. Generally employees who are
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sexually harassed must report such behavior
to their employer, and the employer is given
the opportunity to attempt to stop any sexually
harassing behavior. If internal remedies have
been exhausted and the harassment continues,
victims of harassment can then file a charge
with the EEOC or FEPA. The EEOC then investigates and attempts to resolve the claim without
litigation. If the EEOC is unable to successfully
conciliate the case, the EEOC may bring suit in
federal court or, more commonly, issue a “right
to sue” notice to the charging party.
I calculate gender-specific estimates of the
risk of sexual harassment by industry and age
group.2 The numerators in this risk measure
are the number of sexual harassment charges
by industry, age group, and sex. The denominators are the corresponding levels of industry
employment by age group and sex from the CPS
(excluding self-employed workers who would
generally not be able to claim sexual harassment
against an employer).
Because the sexual harassment rates are calculated at the industry level, the biggest problem in calculating sexual harassment risk is
missing data on industry codes in the EEOC
claims data. Industry is not a required field on
the EEOC claims records. Industry code is missing in about 28 percent of the claims prior to
2006. According to an EEOC employee, missing
data on industry became an even greater problem beginning in 2006 (for example, NAICS
code is missing for 56 percent of the claims
in 2008), in part because in 2006 the EEOC
switched from SIC code to NAICS code and the
drop-down menu for NAICS code was harder
to use. For claims filed prior to 2006 with SIC
code reported, the EEOC used a crosswalk to
assign NAICS code. In addition, if the employer
named in the claim could be linked to the EEO-1
database (e.g., private firms with 100 or more
employees or private federal contractors with
50 or more employees), then the NAICS code
reported in the EEO-1 form is transferred to
the EEOC claims file. Thus, industry code is
missing more frequently in smaller firms than
in larger firms and is also missing far more frequently starting in 2006 than in earlier years.

2
This follows the methodology used to construct fatality
rates by industry, age, and sex in W. Kip Viscusi and Joni
Hersch (2008).
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Table 1—Sexual Harassment Rates by Major Industry

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Wholesale and retail trade
Transportation and utilities
Information
Financial activities
Professional and business services
Educational and health services
Leisure and hospitality
Other services
Public administration

Female
17.94
71.39
19.84
15.65
9.91
17.24
18.78
6.81
13.98
3.62
14.03
6.46
16.42

Male
0.70
2.27
0.47
1.25
1.29
1.21
2.68
1.45
1.83
1.62
2.08
1.26
2.17

Percent female
25.21
9.71
9.58
30.86
45.46
24.48
43.40
57.58
43.16
75.13
51.55
52.70
45.94

Notes: Per 100,000 workers. Rates are calculated from EEOC Charge Data FY 2000–FY 2004 based on claims by individuals
in which at least one issue was sexual harassment and in which industry is reported. Employment data calculated using 2004
CPS.

The number of claims by industry, age group,
and sex are used as the numerators in the calculation of sexual harassment rates, so eliminating all observations with missing information,
even if random, leads to lower sexual harassment rates for an industry/age group/sex than
are true. If industry code is missing at random,
then we have classical measurement error in
an explanatory variable in the regression equation, and the coefficient on this variable will be
biased toward zero. A regression of an indicator for missing industry on characteristics of
claims shows that although there is some systematic variation in the probability that industry
is recorded, observable characteristics explain
fairly little of the variation in whether industry is reported. Controlling for age group, sex,
whether the claim was reported to the EEOC
or FEPA, indicators of strength of claim (from
definitely litigate to dismiss), firm size, institution type (e.g., private employer, educational
institution), filing year, and race, the adjusted
R2 is a very low 0.038 based on EEOC claims
for the period FY 2000–FY 2004. Thus, while
recognizing that the sexual harassment rate is
measured with error, the low predictive power of
observable characteristics suggests that assuming the measurement error is largely random is
not unreasonable.
Because the number of missing industry codes
increased substantially after 2006, I use data
from FY 2000–FY 2004 to calculate the numerators in sexual harassment rate 
calculation.

There are 48,741 individual claims that include
sexual harassment as an issue. Of these claims,
42,065 are claims by women and 6,676 are
claims by men. The denominators are based on
employment data from the 2004 CPS excluding
self-employed workers. The sexual harassment
rates used in the wage equations are calculated
by sex for two-digit industry (52 industries) and
six age groups (15–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54,
55–64, and age 65 and older).
II. Patterns of Sexual Harassment Risk

Table 1 reports sexual harassment rates per
100,000 workers by sex and major industry, as
well as the percent female in the industry. The
pattern across industries indicates that women
are at a greater risk of sexual harassment in
male-dominated industries, with the pairwise
correlation between the female rate and percent
female equal to −0.68 ( p = 0.01). The male
rate is not correlated with the female rate; nor
is the male rate correlated with percent female.
Figure 1 demonstrates the pattern of sexual
harassment risk for women by age for four
selected industries, which shows an inverted
U-shaped pattern of risk of sexual harassment
with age. The pattern is largely similar for the
other industries. With the exception of mining,
men also have an inverted U-shaped pattern of
risk of sexual harassment with age. Men’s risk
of sexual harassment is substantially below that
of women at every age.

Compensating Differentials for Sexual Harassment

VOL. 101 NO. 3

633

30
Construction

25

20
Transportation
and utilities

15
Trade

10

Educational and
health services

5

0

15–24

25–34

35–44

45–54

55–64

Figure 1. Sexual Harassment Rates per 100,000 Workers, Selected Industries: Females

III. Wage Equations

I estimate conventional wage equations controlling for sexual harassment risk and for other
standard determinants of wages using CPS data
for 2005. The dependent variable is the log of the
hourly wage, which is either reported directly or
calculated as weekly earnings divided by usual
hours worked per week. In addition to the sexual harassment rate, the explanatory variables
are years of education and potential experience and its square, and indicator variables for
occupation (management, business, financial;
professional and related; healthcare support;
protective service; food preparation and serving related; building and grounds cleaning and
maintenance; personal care and service; sales
and related; office and administrative support;
natural resources, construction, maintenance;
and production, transportation, material moving), race (white; black; American Indian;
Asian or Pacific Islander; or more than one race
reported), Hispanic ethnicity, married, employed
by the government, union member or covered by
union contract, full time employment, metropolitan location, and region.
Because there is evidence that sexual harassment is more prevalent in work settings with
predominantly one sex, it is possible that any
positive effect of sexual harassment for women
reflects the higher pay associated with maledominated jobs. I also therefore control for

the percent female in the individual’s narrowly
defined (four-digit) industry.
Table 2 summarizes the results with separate
wage regressions estimated by sex, reporting
only the coefficients on sexual harassment risk
and percent female in the industry. The standard
errors are clustered by industry and age group
because all workers within the same industry
and age group are assigned the same genderspecific value for sexual harassment. For ease of
interpretation, this table also reports mean predicted log wages estimated at the sample means
of all variables and at the sample means of all
variables assuming a zero sexual harassment
rate.
As expected, there is an inverse relation
between the percent female in the industry and
wages for both men and women. Both men and
women receive a statistically significant wage
premium for the risk of sexual harassment. The
log wage difference between a job with zero
sexual harassment risk and a job with the mean
sexual harassment risk is 0.0155, or about 25
cents per hour for women, and 0.0252, or about
50 cents per hour for men. The large compensation for sexual harassment risk for men is surprising. One possible explanation is that since
men infrequently file sexual harassment claims,
those claims that are filed are particularly egregious, and exposure to such risk warrants a
larger compensating differential than received
by women.
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Table 2—Wage Compensation for
Sexual Harassment Risk
(Dependent variable: Log of hourly wage)

Sexual harassment rate by
industry, age, and sex per
100,000 workers
Percent female in industry

Coefficients
(Standard error)
Female
Male
0.0018*
0.0186**
(0.0009)
(0.0070)
-0.2000**
(0.0367)

-0.2634**
(0.0292)

Adjusted R-squared

0.40

0.44

Number of observations

77,896

79,383

Average sexual harassment rate

8.6056

1.3540

Predicted log wage:
At sample means
Sexual harassment rate = 0

2.6403
2.6248

2.8318
2.8066

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by two-digit industry and age group are reported in parentheses. Sample
is comprised of respondents to the 2005 CPS who are
employed, not self-employed, ages between 18 and 64, with
wages between $1.50 and $100 per hour. Additional variables included in the regressions are a constant, potential
work experience, potential experience squared, years of education, and indicator variables for occupation, race, Hispanic
ethnicity, married, government employer, union or employee
association, full-time employment, metropolitan location,
and region. All values are weighted by CPS earnings weight.
** Significant at the 1 percent level.
* Significant at the 5 percent level.

IV. Concluding Remarks

Although illegal, sexual harassment occurs
in the workplace. The risk of sexual harassment
varies by sex, industry, and age. Women face far
greater risk of sexual harassment than men in
every industry and at every age, and women’s
risk of sexual harassment is positively c orrelated

with the percent male in the industry. The risk
of sexual harassment is highest for workers
between ages 25 and 44.
The central empirical issue addressed in this
paper is whether sexual harassment lowers
wages by reducing productivity or raises wages
as workers require a compensating differential
to incur this risk. Sexually harassing behaviors
range from sexual looks or sexual jokes from
coworkers to assault and rape, with surveys indicating that sexual looks and comments are by
far the most common type of workplace sexually
harassing behavior. Because sexual harassment
is costly for firms to eliminate, some forms of
sexual harassment such as looks and comments
that are hard to monitor may occur in the workplace. This paper shows that, on balance, workers receive a wage premium for exposure to the
risk of sexual harassment in much the same way
that workers receive a wage premium for the risk
of fatality or injury.
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